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Abstract
An interaction system has a finite set of agents that interact pairwise, de-
pending on the current state of the system. Symmetric decomposition of the
matrix of interaction coefficients yields the representation of states by self-
adjoint matrices and hence a spectral representation. As a result, coopera-
tion systems, decision systems and quantum systems all become visible as
manifestations of special interaction systems. The treatment of the theory is
purely mathematical and does not require any special knowledge of physics.
It is shown how standard notions in cooperative game theory arise naturally
in this context. In particular, Fourier transformation of cooperative games
becomes meaningful. Moreover, quantum games fall into this framework.
Finally, a theory of Markov evolution of interaction states is presented that
generalizes classical homogeneous Markov chains to the present context.
Keywords: cooperative game, decision system, evolution, Fourier transform,
interaction system, measurement, quantum game
JEL Classification: C71
1 Introduction
In an interaction system, economic (or general physical) agents interact pairwise,
but do not necessarily cooperate towards a common goal. Yet, this model arises as
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a natural generalization of the model of cooperative TU-games, for which already
Owen [24] introduced the co-value as an assessment of the pairwise interaction
of two cooperating players1. In fact, it turns out that the context of interaction
systems provides an appropriate framework for the analysis of cooperative games
(cf. Faigle and Grabisch [6]). It is therefore of interest to investigate interaction
systems in their own right.
A second motivation comes from strong arguments (put forth most promi-
nently by Penrose [25]) that the human mind with its decisions and actions con-
stitutes a physical quantum system and should therefore be modelled according
to the laws of quantum mechanics. This idea has furthered a seemingly new and
rapidly growing branch of game theory where in so-called quantum games the
players are assumed to execute actions on quantum systems according to the per-
tinent laws of physics2. The actions of the quantum players typically transform
quantum bit vectors according to the same mechanisms attributed to so-called
quantum computers. Many classical games of economic or behavioral interest
have been studied in this setting. The Prisoners’ Dilemma, for example, has been
found to offer a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium in the quantum model where no
such equilibrium exists in the classical variant (Eisert et al. [3]).
The quantum games discussed in the literature are generally non-cooperative.
Although cooperative game theory has been applied to quantum theory3, a co-
operative quantum game theory has not really developped4. In general, it is felt
that quantum game theory has a highly physical side to it5 and that there is a gap
between physics and rational game theoretic behavior6.
Therefore, it may be surprising that the mathematical analysis of interaction
systems exhibits no conceptual gap to exist between the ”classical” and the ”quan-
tum” world in game theory. In particular, no special knowledge of quantum me-
chanics (or physics in general) is needed to understand game theoretic behavior
mathematically. Both aspects are sides of the same coin. The quantum aspects
arise from the choice of terminology in the mathematical structural analysis rather
than from innately physical environments. Yet, much structural insight is gained
from the study of classical interaction and decision systems in terms of quantum
theoretical language.
The key in the analysis is the symmetry decomposition of the matrix of inter-
action coefficients αxy associated with a state α of an interaction system. The
decomposition allows us to represent states by self-adjoint matrices. Spectral
1see also Grabisch and Roubens [9] for a general approach
2see, e.g., the surveys Grabbe [8] and Huo et al. [12]
3e.g., Vourdas [30]
4Iqbal and Toor [15] discuss a 3 player situation
5see, e.g., Levy [18]
6cf. Wolpert [29]
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decomposition then shows that interaction states have real eigenvalues. More-
over, each state is represented by a linear combination of pure density matrices.
The connection to physical quantum models is now immediate: The axioms of
quantum theory stipulate that quantum states can be described as convex com-
binations of pure density matrices. It follows that interaction systems subsume
(finite-dimensional) quantum systems as special cases. We develop the mathe-
matical details in Section 2. This section treats also measurements on interaction
systems as linear functionals on the space of interaction matrices and provides a
probabilistic interpretation that is commensurate with the probabilistic interpreta-
tion of measurements in standard physical quantum theory.
Section 3 approaches a binary decision system with a single decision maker
as a system with two ”interacting” alternatives. Decision systems with n decision
makers arise as tensor products of n single decision systems. Again, the relation
with quantum models is immediate: The states of an n-decision system are de-
scribed by complex n-dimensional vectors of unit length in exactly the same way
as such vectors are assumed to describe the states of an n-dimensional quantum
system in the Schro¨dinger picture of quantum theory.
The latter yields a very intuitive interpretation of quantum games: The players
select their strategies as to move some decision makers into accepting an alter-
native that offers financial rewards to the individual players, where the financial
reward is given as a linear functional on the space to decision states (Section 3.4).
The choice of a set-theoretic representation of the decision states shows how
classical cooperative TU games may be viewed as particular decision states of a
finite set of decision makers. The associated probabilistic interpretation exhibits
in particular Aubin’s [1] fuzzy games as decision instances where the decision
makers (or ”players”) take their decisions probabilistically but independently from
one another.
The model of quantum computing7 views computation as the application of
certain linear operators on quantum states. We point out in Section 3.3 how well-
known linear transformations (e.g., Mo¨bius or Walsh transform) in cooperative
games theory arise as tensor products of simple transformations on single decision
systems. Moreover, we show that the classical Fourier transform is well-defined in
the context of interaction systems, while it does not seem to exist when attention
is restricted to the classical space of TU games.
We finally present a linear model for the evolution of interaction systems and
discuss its ”Markovian” aspects. In addition to the application examples in the
course of the treatment, the appendix contains a worked out example of an inter-
action system with two agents.
7see, e.g., Nielsen and Chang [22]
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2 Interaction systems
An interaction system is a pair X = (X,A), where X is a set of agents and A a
set of states such that for any state α ∈ A and agents x, y ∈ X , there is a well-
defined interaction coefficient αxy ∈ R. The corresponding matrix A = [αxy] ∈
RX×X of interaction coefficients reflects the interaction instance relative to the
state α. Interpreting the diagonal elements Axx (interactions of the agents x with
themselves) as the activity levels of the individual agents in state α, we will refer
to A also as an activity matrix.
AT denotes the transpose of A. We do not necessarily assume interaction
symmetry Axy = Ayx (i.e., A
T 6= A may hold). Moreover, we allow “interaction”
and “agent” to be taken in the most general sense. So agents can be physical or
more abstract entities. However, we assume finiteness
• |X| <∞
throughout this investigation. We give some examples of interaction systems.
Example 2.1 (Buyers and sellers). The set X of agents is partitioned into buyers
and sellers. Let txy be the amount of transaction done between x and y. So
txy = 0 holds if x and y are both buyers or both are sellers. In general, we have
txy + txy = 0. It follows that the corresponding transaction state is described by
the transaction matrix A = [txy]. A is skew-symmetric (i.e., A
T = −A holds).
Example 2.2 (Communication networks). Assume that agents in X can commu-
nicate pairwise and model this ability by a (directed or undirected) graph or,
equivalently, by a matrix A which represents the current state of communication,
where Axy indicates the level (quality) of communication (or information) flowing
from x to y. Note that A need not be symmetric.
Example 2.3 (Influence networks). Assume that the set X of agents forms a net-
work and that agents communicate or interact through this network. Through
communication or interaction, the opinion of the agents on a given topic or de-
cision to be made may be subject to change due to mutual influence8. The corre-
sponding influence matrix A reflects the amount and type of influence that agents
exert among themselves. More precisely, a nonzero coefficient Axy indicates that
agent x listens or is sensitive to the opinion of agent y. Axy > 0 measures the ex-
tent to which x follows the opinion of y (withAxy = 1meaning that x fully follows
y) and Axy < 0 indicates the extent to which x will adopt an opinion opposite to
the opinion of y. A need not be symmetric nor skew-symmetric.
8see, e.g., Grabisch and Rusinowska [10, 11]
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Example 2.4 (Cooperative games). Let N be the set of agents (or ”players”), in-
volved in a cooperative effort in view of achieving some goal. For any coalition
S ⊆ N of players, v(S) is the quantitative result of the cooperation of the mem-
bers of S (assuming that the players inN \ S show no activity): achieved benefit,
saved cost, etc. Game theory models such a situation by a function v : 2N → R
(TU-game). In our setting, this situation can be expressed by letting X = 2N be
the collection of all possible coalitions and associating with v the diagonal activ-
ity matrix V with diagonal coefficients VSS = v(S) (and VST = 0 for S 6= T ).
We revisit cooperative games from a different point of view (namely as binary
decision systems with |N | decision makers) in Section 3.2 below.
Example 2.5 (Interaction in 2-additive games). Take X to be the set of players of
a TU-game v : 2X → R. Grabisch and Roubens [9] introduced the notion of an
interaction index to model the interaction inside any coalition S ⊆ X . v is said to
be k-additive if the interaction in coalitions of size greater than k is zero. It follows
that 2-additive games are completely determined by the interaction index Ixy for
pairs of agents together with the interactions Ix of singletons, which corresponds
to their Shapley value. The resulting interaction matrix I , with coefficients Ixy for
any x 6= y and Ixx = Ix for x ∈ X , is symmetric. The index Ixy was initially
proposed by Owen [24] under the name “co-value”.
Example 2.6 (Bicooperative games). The situation of Example 2.4 can be refined
by allowing that a cooperating coalition S, another coalition T ⊆ N \ S to exist
that opposes the realization of the goal of S (with the players in N \ (S ∪ T )
being inactive). Such a situation gives rise to a so-called bicooperative games9
and is usually modelled by a biset function v that assigns to any pair (S, T ) of
disjoint coalitions a quantity v(S, T ). With X = 2N , v would be represented in
our setting by a (non-diagonal) matrix V having coefficients VST = v(S, T ) for
any disjoint S, T ∈ 2N , and VST = 0 otherwise. Note that V is neither symmetric
nor skew-symmetric in general.
Returning to a general interaction system X = (X,A), recall that the space
RX×X of all possible interaction matrices is a |X|2-dimensional euclidian vector
space. Moreover, RX×X is a real Hilbert space relative to the inner product
(A|B〉 =
∑
x,y∈X
AxyBxy =
∑
x∈X
(ATB)xx = tr(A
TB),
where tr(C) denotes the trace of a matrix C. The associated norm is the so-called
Frobenius norm
‖A‖ =
√
〈A|A〉 =
√∑
x,y∈X
|Axy|2.
9see Bilbao et al. [2], Labreuche and Grabisch [21]
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We define ‖α‖ = ‖[αxy]‖ as the norm of the state α ∈ A.
2.1 Symmetry decomposition and hermitian representation
Denote by S+X the subspace of symmetric and by S
−
X the subspace of skew-symmetric
matrices in RX×X . For any C ∈ S+X and B ∈ S−X , one has
〈C|B〉 = 〈CT |BT 〉 = −〈C|B〉 and hence 〈C|B〉 = 0.
Setting A+ = 1
2
(A + AT ) ∈ S+X and A− = 12(A − AT ) ∈ S−X , one finds that
A ∈ RX×X is the superposition
A = A+ + A− (1)
of a symmetric and a skew-symmetric matrix. It follows that S+X and S
−
X are
orthogonal complements in RX×X and that the symmetry decomposition (1) of A
is uniquely determined and obeys the pythagorean law
‖A‖2 = ‖A+‖2 + ‖A−‖2.
A convenient way of keeping track of the symmetry properties of A is its
hermitian representation with the complex coefficients Aˆxy = A
+
xy + iA
−
xy
Aˆ = A+ + iA− ∈ CX×X , (2)
where C = R+ iR denotes the field of complex numbers with the imaginary unit
i =
√−1. So Aˆ = A holds if and only ifA is symmetric. Moreover, the hermitian
space
HX = {A+ + iA− | A ∈ RX×X} = S+X + iS−X ⊆ CX×X
is isomorphic with RX×X as a real Hilbert space. Recalling the conjugate of the
complex matrix C = D+ iF withD,F ∈ RX×X , as the matrix C = D− iF and
the adjoint as the matrix C∗ = C
T
, the inner product becomes
〈A|B〉 = tr(ATB) = tr(Aˆ∗Bˆ) = 〈Aˆ|Bˆ〉 (A,B ∈ RX×X).
A readily verified but important observation identifies the hermitian matrices
as precisely the self-adjoint matrices:
C ∈ HX ⇐⇒ C∗ = C (C ∈ CX×X).
The fact that RX×X and HX are isomorphic Hilbert spaces allows us to view
the interaction matrices A and their hermitian representations Aˆ as equally valid
representatives of interaction states. We denote by
αˆ = Aˆ = A+ + iA−
the hermitian representation of the state α with interaction matrix A = [αxy].
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2.1.1 Binary interaction
We illustrate the preceding concepts with the interaction of just two agents x, y,
i.e.,X = {x, y}. A basis for the symmetric space S+X is given by
I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, π1 =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, π2 =
(
0 1
1 0
)
.
The skew-symmetric space S−X is 1-dimensional and generated by
π3 =
(
0 −1
1 0
)
.
Thinking of the interaction of an agent with itself as its activity level, one can
interpret these matrices as follows:
(i) I: no proper interaction, the two agents have the same unit activity level.
(ii) π1: no proper interaction, opposite unit activity levels.
(iii) π2: no proper activity, symmetric interaction: there is a unit ”interaction
flow” from x to y and a unit flow from y to x.
(iv) π3: no proper activity, skew-symmetric interaction: there is just a unit flow
from x to y or, equivalently, a (−1)-flow from y to x.
The corresponding hermitian representations are Iˆ = I , πˆ1 = π1, πˆ2 = π2 and
πˆ3 = iπ3 =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
.
Remark 2.1. The self-adjoint matrices πˆ1, πˆ2, πˆ3 are the well-known Pauli spin
matrices that describe the interaction of a particle with an external electromag-
netic field in quantum mechanics. Details of the underlying physical model, how-
ever, are irrelevant for our present approach. Our interaction analysis is purely
mathematical. It applies to economic and game theoretic contexts equally well.
Remark 2.2. The relation π23 = −I (i.e., ”π3 =
√−I”) exhibits π3 in the role of
an ”imaginary unit” in R2×2. Indeed, the 2-dimensional matrix space
C = {aI + bπ3 | a, b ∈ R} ⊆ R2×2
is closed under matrix multiplication and algebraically isomorphic with the field
C of complex numbers.
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2.2 Spectral theory
It is a well-known fact in linear algebra that a complex matrix C ∈ CX×X is self-
adjoint if and only if there is a diagonal matrix Λ with diagonal elements λx ∈ R
and a unitary matrix U ∈ CX× (i.e., U∗ = U−1) that diagonalizes C in the sense
Λ = U∗CU. (3)
The real numbers λx are the eigenvalues and form the spectrum of C ∈ HX . The
corresponding column vectors Ux of U are eigenvectors of C and yield a basis for
the complex vector space CX .
If α is a state of X = (X,A), we refer to the eigenvalues of its self-adjoint
representation αˆ simply as the eigenvalues of α. A state thus has always real
eigenvalues. If the interaction matrix [αxy] is symmetric, then αˆ = [αxy] holds
and the eigenvalues of [αxy] and αˆ coincide. In general, however, an interaction
matrix [αxy] does not necessarily have real eigenvalues.
The diagonalization (3) implies the spectral representation
C =
∑
x∈X
λxUxU
∗
x (4)
with pairwise orthogonal vectors Ux ∈ CX of unit length ‖Ux‖ =
√
U∗xUx = 1
and real numbers λx. (4) shows that the members of HX are precisely the real
linear combinations of (self-adjoint) matrices of the form
uu∗ with u ∈ CX s.t. ‖u‖2 = u∗u = 1.
Remark 2.3. In quantum theory, a matrix of the form uu∗ with u ∈ CX of length
‖u‖ = 1 is termed a pure density (matrix). In the so-called Heisenberg picture,
the states of a |X|-dimensional quantum system are thought to be represented by
the convex linear combinations of pure densities. We thus find that the states of a
general interaction system are represented by linear (but not necessarily convex)
combinations of pure densities.
2.3 Measurements
By a (linear) measurement on the interaction systemX = (X,A), we understand a
linear functional f : RX×X → R on the space of all possible interaction instances.
f(A) is the value observed when the agents inX interact according to A. So there
is a matrix F ∈ RX×X such that
f(A) = 〈F |A〉 = 〈Fˆ |Aˆ〉 for all A ∈ RX×X . (5)
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Remark 2.4. The second equality in (5) shows that our measurement model is
compatible with the measurement model of quantum theory, where a ”measuring
instrument” relative to a quantum system is represented by a self-adjoint ma-
trix Fˆ and produces the value 〈Fˆ |Aˆ〉 when the system is in the quantum state Aˆ.
However, also many classical notions of game theory can be viewed from that
perspective.
We give some illustrating examples.
• Cooperative games. A linear value for a player in a cooperative game
(sensu Ex. 2.4), is a linear functional on the collection of diagonal inter-
action matrices V . Clearly, any such functional extends linearly to all in-
teraction matrices A. So the Shapley value [27] (or any linear value (prob-
abilistic, Banzhaf, egalitarian etc.) can be seen as a measurement. Indeed,
taking the example of the Shapley value, for a given player i ∈ N , the
quantity
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\i
(n− s− 1)!s!
n!
(v(S ∪ i)− v(S))
with s = |S|, acts linearly on the diagonal matrices V representing the
characteristic function v. Similar conclusions apply to bicooperative games.
• Communication Networks. The literature on graphs and networks10 pro-
poses various measures for the centrality (Bonacich centrality, betweenness
etc.) or prestige (Katz prestige index) of a given node in the graph, taking
into account its position, the number of paths going through it, etc. These
measures are typically linear relative to the incidence matrix of the graph
and thus represent measurements.
Further important examples arise from payoff evaluations in n-person games be-
low (cf. Remark 3.4).
2.3.1 Probabilistic interpretation
If Aˆ =
∑
x∈X λxUxU
∗
x is the spectral representation of the self-adjoint matrix Aˆ,
then the measurement (5) takes the form
f(A) =
∑
x∈X
λx〈Fˆ |UxU∗x〉 =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈X
λxµy〈VyV ∗y |UxU∗x〉, (6)
10 see, e.g., Jackson [16]
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where Fˆ =
∑
y∈X µyVyV
∗
y is the spectral representation of Fˆ . Formula (6) has an
immediate intuitive probabilistic interpretation, well-known in quantum theory,
when we set
pxy = 〈VyV ∗y |UxU∗x〉 = tr(VyV ∗y UxU∗x〉.
Indeed, Lemma 2.1 (below) implies pxy ≥ 0. Moreover, since the Vy and Ux yield
unitary bases of CX , we have∑
x,y∈X
pxy =
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈X
〈VyV ∗y |UxU∗x〉 =
∑
x∈X
〈I|UxU∗x〉 = 〈I|I〉 = 1.
i.e., the pxy constitute a probability distribution on the setX×X of pairs of agents
(x, y) and
f(A) =
∑
x,y∈X
λxµypxy
is the expected value of the corresponding eigenvalue products λxµy.
Lemma 2.1. Let u, v ∈ Ck be arbitrary vectors with complex coordinates ui and
vj . Then 〈V |U〉 ≥ 0 holds for the (k × k)-matrices U = uu∗ and V = vv∗.
Proof. Let z =
∑
j ujvj . Since Vij = vivj and Uij = uiuj , one finds
〈V |U〉 =
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
vivjuiuj =
k∑
i=1
viui · z = zz = |z|2 ≥ 0.

3 Decision analysis
Consider n decision makers, each of them facing a choice between two alterna-
tives. Depending on the context, the alternatives can have different interpretations:
’no’ or ’yes’ in a voting context, for example, or ’inactive’ or ’active’ if the de-
cision maker is a player in a game theoretic or economic context etc.. Moreover,
the alternatives do not have to be the same for all decision makers. Nevertheless,
it is convenient to denote the alternatives simply by the symbols ’0’ and ’1’. This
results in no loss of generality.
3.1 The case n = 1
We start with a single decision maker with the binary alternatives ’0’ and ’1’. Let
djk ∈ R be a measure for the tendency of the decisionmaker to consider the choice
10
of alternative j but to possibly switch to alternative k. The 4-dimensional coef-
ficient vector d = (d00, d10, d01, d11) represents this state of the decision maker.
Moreover, in view of the isomorphism
R
4 ∼= (R+ iR)× (R+ iR),
we can represent d by a pair of complex numbers δj :
dˆ = (d00 + id10, d01 + id11) = (δ0, δ1).
In the non-trivial case d 6= 0, there is no loss of generality when we assume d (and
hence dˆ) to be unit normalized
‖d‖ =
√
d200 + d
2
10 + d
2
01 + d
2
11 = ‖dˆ‖ = 1.
So we think of the unit vector set
S = {δ = (δ0, δ1)T ∈ C2 | ‖δ‖2 = |δ0|2 + |δ1|2 = 1}
as the set of (proper) states of the decision maker.
3.1.1 Decisions and interactions
While a vector state δ = (δ0, δ1)
T ∈ S describes a state of the decision maker, the
decision framework implies a natural interaction system in the set X = {0, 1} of
alternatives. Indeed, the matrix
D = δδ∗ =
(
δ0δ0 δ0δ1
δ1δ0 δ1δ1
)
= D = δδ∗ =
(|δ0|2 δ0δ1
δ1δ0 |δ1|2
)
(7)
associates with the decision state δ a ”quantum state” with densityD, which may
be interpreted as the self-adjoint representation of an interaction state on X . The
latter exhibits the alternatives ’0’ and ’1’ as interacting agents in their own right
in the decision process.
3.1.2 Decision probabilities
The decision state vector dˆ = (d00+id10, d01+id11) = (δ0, δ1) ∈ S defines a pro-
bability distribution p onX2 = {0, 1}2 with probabilities p(d)jk = d2jk. Accordingly,
the probability for the alternative ’k’ to be accepted is
p
(d)
k = p
(d)
0k + p
(d)
1k = |δk|2 (k = 0, 1).
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We arrive at the same probabilities when we apply suitable measurements in the
sense of Section 2.3 on the interaction system on X with the self-adjoint state
representation D as in (7). To see this, let us measure the activity level of k (i.e.,
the interaction of k with itself). This measurement corresponds to the application
of the matrix Fk = eke
T
k , where ek is the kth unit vector inR
2. The expected value
of this measurement is
〈Fk|D〉 = |δk|2 = p(d)k .
Let us now take another look at earlier examples:
(i) Influence networks: While it may be unusual to speak of ”influence” if there
is only a single agent, the possible decisions of this agent are its opinions
(’yes’ or ’no’), and the state of the agent hesitating between ’yes’ and ’no’
is described by (δ0, δ1) ∈ C2 (with probability |δ0|2 to say ’no’ and |δ1|2 to
say ’yes’).
(ii) Cooperative games: As before, ”cooperation” may sound awkward in the
case of a single player. However, the possible decisions of the player are
relevant and amount to being either active or inactive in the given game.
Here, (δ0, δ1) represents a state of deliberation of the player that results in
the probability p
(d)
k for being active (resp. inactive).
3.1.3 Quantum bits
Denote by |j〉 the event that the decision maker selects alternative j. Thinking of
|0〉 and |1〉 as independent generators of a 2-dimensional complex vector space,
we can represent the decision states equally well as formal linear combinations
δ = δ0|0〉+ δ1|1〉 ((δ0, δ1)T ∈ S). (8)
The expression (8) is the representation of the states of a 1-dimensional quantum
system in the so-called Schro¨dinger picture of quantum mechanics. Strong argu-
ments have been put forward11 that the decision process of the humanmind should
be considered to be a quantum process and a binary decision state should thus be
described as a quantum state.
In the theory of quantum computing12, an expression of the form (8) represents
a quantum bit. |0〉 and |1〉 correspond to the boolean bits of classical computation.
11see, e.g., Penrose [25]
12see, e.g., Nielsen and Chuang [22]
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3.1.4 Non-binary alternatives
It is straightforward to generalize the decision model to k > 1 alternatives ’0’,
’1’, . . ., ’k− 1’. We let |j〉 denote the event that ’j’ is selected. Interpreting ’j’ as
representing an ”activity” at the jth of k possible levels, the decision maker is es-
sentially a player in a multichoice game in the sense of Hsiao and Raghavan [14].
Decision states are now described by formal linear combinations
δ =
k−1∑
j=0
δj |j〉 with δj ∈ C s.t. ‖δ‖2 =
k−1∑
j=0
|δj|2 = 1
and |δj |2 being the probability for alternative j to be taken.
3.2 The case n ≥ 2
We now extend our framework to the case of several decision makers and consider
first the binary case. We letD denote of the decision system for n = 1 that can be
in any state as in Section 3.1. The system of n > 1 decision makers is then given
by the n-fold tensor product:
D
n = D⊗ · · · ⊗D (n times).
To make this precise, recall the tensor product of a vector space V with a fixed
basis B = {b1, . . . , bn} and a vector space W with basis G = {g1, . . . , gm} over
the common real or complex scalar field F. We first define the set B ⊗ G of all
(formal) products bi ⊗ gj and extend the products linearly to products of vectors
in V andW , i.e., if v =
∑
vibi and w =
∑
wjgj , then
v ⊗ w = ( n∑
i=1
vibi
)⊗ ( m∑
j=1
wjgj
)
=
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
(viwj)bi ⊗ gj. (9)
So a coordinate representation of v ⊗ w is given by the (n × m)-matrix with
coefficients viwj . Moreover, we note the multiplication rule for the norm:
‖v ⊗ w‖2 = ‖v‖2‖w‖2.
The tensor product V ⊗W is the nm-dimensional vector space with basis B⊗G.
It is well-known that the tensor product of vectors is associative and distributive
and linear relative to the scalar field F.
We defineDn as the system with the state set
Sn = {δ ∈ C2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ C2 | ‖δ‖ = 1}.
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The construction becomes immediately clear when bit notation is employed. For
any sequence j1 . . . jn ∈ {0, 1}n, we define the n-bit
|j1 . . . jn〉 = |j1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |jn〉. (10)
The states ofDn now take the form of linear combinations
δ =
∑
k∈{0,1}n
δk|k〉 with δk ∈ C and
∑
k |δk|2 = 1. (11)
In state δ, the (joint) decision k ∈ {0, 1}n is reached with probability |δk|2.
Remark 3.1. Note the relation with the model of k decision alternatives in Sec-
tion 3.1.4: The representation of δ in (11) allows us to view Dn as the context of
a single decision maker that faces the 2n alternatives |j〉.
As an illustration, consider the case n = 2. The decision systemD2 = D⊗D
relative to a pair of binary alternatives represents the states in the form
δ = δ00|00〉+ δ10|10〉+ δ11|11〉+ δ01|01〉 (δij ∈ C,
∑
j,k∈{0,1}
|δjk|2 = 1).
In particular, we have
(α0|0〉+ α1|1〉)⊗ (β0|0〉+ β1|1〉) =
∑
i,j∈{0,1}
αiβj |ij〉.
In general, it is often convenient to represent states in set theoretic notation.
So we let N = {1, . . . , n} and identify n-bits with subsets:
k = j1 . . . jn ∈ {0, 1}n ←→ K = {ℓ ∈ N | iℓ = 1},
which yields the state representation
δ =
∑
K⊆N
δK |K〉 (δK ∈ C,
∑
K⊆N
|δK |2 = 1). (12)
The latter allows us to view a state simply as a valuation α : 2N → C that assigns
to each subsetK ⊆ N a complex number αK ∈ C. This generalizes the classical
model of cooperative games with n players to complex-valued cooperative games
in a natural way.
The probabilistic interpretation says that the decision n-tuple k = i1 . . . in is
realized in a non-trivial state α ofDn with probability
pαk =
|αk|2
‖α‖2 , where ‖α‖
2 =
∑
k∈{0,1}n
|αk|2. (13)
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Coming back to our examples, a similar interpretation as for the single agent case
can be given. Specifically, in the case of the influence network in state α, pαk in
(13) yields the probability that a given coalition K of agents says ’yes’ and the
other agents say ’no’, while in the case of cooperative games, pαk is the probability
for a given coalitionK to be active while the remaining players are not.
3.2.1 Entanglement and fuzzy systems
We say that a state δ ofDn is reducible if there is a 0 < m < n such that
α = α⊗ β for some state α ofDm and state β ofDn−m.
In this reducible case, the state δ arises from lower dimensional states α and β that
are probabilistically independent. Indeed, we have ‖δ‖ = ‖α‖ · ‖β‖, δkℓ = αkβℓ
and hence
pδkℓ = p
α
k · pβℓ for all k ∈ {0, 1}m, ℓ ∈ {0, 1}n−m.
Already for n = 2, it is easy to see that Dn admits irreducible states. Such states
are said to be entangled.
Aubin [1] has introduced the model of fuzzy cooperation of a setN of n play-
ers as a system whose states are characterized by real vectors
w = (w1, . . . , wn) with 0 ≤ wj ≤ 1.
In state w, player j decides to be active in the cooperation effort with probability
wj and inactive to be with probability 1 − wj . A coalition S ⊆ N is assumed to
be formed with probability
w(S) =
∏
s∈S
∏
t∈N\S
wi(1− wt)
(see also Marichal [19]). So the players act independently in each ”fuzzy” state
w. Entangled states are thus excluded. In particular, one sees that our model of
interactive decisions is strictly more general than the fuzzy model.
3.3 Linear transformations
Let againB = {b1, . . . , bn} be a basis of the vector space V andG = {g1, . . . , gm}
a basis of the vector spaceW over the common scalar field F and consider linear
operators L : V → V andM : W →W . The assignment
L⊗M(b ⊗ g) = (Lb)⊗ (Mg) ((b, g) ∈ B ×G)
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extends to a unique linear operator L⊗M : V ⊗W → V ⊗W since the elements
b ⊗ g form a basis of V ⊗W . The operator L ⊗M is the tensor product of the
operators L andM .
For illustration, let us apply this construction to various linear operators on
D and derive several linear transformation of well-known importance in game
theory.
3.3.1 Mo¨bius transform
The Mo¨bius operator Z on the state vector space of D is the linear operator such
that
Z|0〉 = |0〉+ |1〉 and Z|1〉 = |1〉.
Z admits a linear inverseM = Z−1, which is determined by
M |1〉 = |1〉 and M |1〉 = |1〉 − |0〉.
The n-fold tensor product Zn = Z ⊗ · · · ⊗ Z acts on the states of Dn in the
following way:
Zn|i1 . . . in〉 = Z|i1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Z|in〉.
SettingN = {1, . . . , n} and S = {j ∈ N | ij = 1}, the set theoretic notation thus
yields
Zn|S〉 =
∑
T⊇S
|T 〉 =
∑
T⊆N
ζST |T 〉
with the incidence coefficients
ζST =
{
1 if S ⊆ T ,
0 otherwise.
For the inverseMn = M ⊗ · · · ⊗M of Zn, one has
Mn|i1 . . . in〉 = M |i1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗M |in〉
and thus for any S ⊆ N ,
Mn|S〉 =
∑
T⊇S
(−1)|T\S||T 〉 =
∑
T⊆N
µST |T 〉
with theMo¨bius coefficients13
µST =
{
(−1)|T\S| if S ⊆ T ,
0 otherwise.
13see Rota [26] for generalizations
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The Mo¨bius operator Zn has well-known game theoretic implications. With
the characteristic function v : 2N → R of a cooperative game on N , we associate
the state vector
v˜ =
∑
S⊆N
v(S)|S〉.
v is said to be a unanimity game if v˜ = Zn|S〉 holds for some S ⊆ N . In general,
we may compute the Mo¨bius transform
vˆ = Znv˜ =
∑
S⊆N
v(S)Zn|S〉 =
∑
S⊆N
vˆ(S)|S〉
which expresses the Mo¨bius transform vˆ of v˜ as a linear combination of state
vectors of unanimity games. Similarly, an application of the inverseMn yields
v˜ = Mnvˆ =
∑
S⊆N
vˆ(S)Mn|S〉 =
∑
S⊆N
∑
T⊆S
(−1)|S\T |vˆ(T )|S〉,
which yields theMo¨bius inversion formula
v(S) =
∑
T⊆S
(−1)|S\T |vˆ(T ) (S ⊆ N)
The parameters hvST = (−1)|S\T |vˆ(T ) are known as the Harsanyi coefficients of v
in cooperative game theory.
3.3.2 Hadamard transform
The Hadamard transformH ofD is the linear transformation with the property
H|0〉 = |0〉+ |1〉√
2
and H|1〉 = |0〉 − |1〉√
2
.
The normalizing factor
√
2 is chosen as to make H norm preserving. Note that in
both states H|0〉 and H|1〉 the alternatives 0 and 1 are attained with equal proba-
bility
p
H|j〉
0 =
1
2
= p
H|j〉
1 (j = 0, 1)).
It is easy to check that H is self-inverse (i.e., H−1 = H). If follows that also the
n-fold tensor product Hn = H ⊗ · · · ⊗H is norm preserving and self-inverse on
the vector state space ofDn. In particular, the 2n state vectors
Hn|i1 . . . in〉 = H|i1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗H|in〉 (ij ∈ {0, 1})
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are linearly independent. In the set theoretic notation, one finds
Hn|S〉 = 1
2n/2
∑
T⊆N
(−1)|S∩T ||T 〉.
Note that in each of the 2n states Hn|S〉 of Dn, the 2n boolean states |T 〉 of Dn
are equi-probable.
Remark 3.2. Both the Mo¨bius as well as the Hadamard transform map state vec-
tors ofDn with real coefficients onto state vectors with real coefficients. In partic-
ular, these transforms imply linear transformations on the space of characteristic
functions of classical cooperative TU-games.
In the classical context, Hn is closely related to the so-called Walsh trans-
form (cf. Walsh [28]), which is also known as Fourier transform in the theory so
so-called pseudo-boolean functions, i.e., essentially (possibly non-zero normal-
ized) characteristic functions14. This transform is an important tool in discrete
mathematics and game theoretic analysis15.
We stress, however, that the Hadamard transform is not the same as the clas-
sical (discrete) Fourier transform (below) onDn if n ≥ 2.
Lastly, we point out an interesting connection of the Hadamard transform with
interaction transforms of Grabisch and Roubens [9], already alluded to in Exam-
ple 2.5. These have been proposed in the context of cooperative games, and are
essentially of two types: the Shapley interaction transform, which extends the
Shapley value, and the Banzhaf interaction transform, which extends the Banzhaf
value. The latter is expressed as follows.
The Banzhaf transform of the TU-game v : 2N → R is the pseudo-boolean
function IB with the values
IvB(S) =
(1
2
)n−s ∑
T⊆N
(−1)|S\T |v(T ) (S ∈ 2N)
representing the quantity of interaction existing among agents in S. IvB(S) > 0
indicates that the cooperation of all agents in S brings more than any combination
of subgroups of S, while IvB(S) < 0 implies some redundancy/overlap in the
cooperation of agents in S.
By the identitification TU-game ’v ↔ state α’, the Hadamard transform be-
comes a transform Hv on TU-games with values
Hv(S) =
1
2n/2
∑
T⊆N
(−1)|S∩T |v(T ).
14Hammer and Rudeanu [13]
15see, e.g., Kalai [17], O’Donnell [23]
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Now, it is easy to check that
IvB(S) =
(−2)s
2n/2
Hv(S)
holds, which yields an interpretation of the Hadamard transform in terms of inter-
action in cooperative contexts.
3.3.3 Fourier transformation
We briefly recall the classical discrete Fourier transform of the coordinate space
C
k. Setting ω = e2πi/k ∈ C, one defines the (unitary) Fourier matrix
Ω =
1√
k

ω1 ω2 . . . ωk
ω2 ω4 . . . ω2k
...
... · · · ...
ωk ω2k . . . ωk
2
 ∈ Ck×k.
The Fourier transform of v ∈ Ck is the vector Ωv ∈ Ck. Applied to decision
systems, the Fourier transform of any state vector will also be a state vector.
Remark 3.3. Note that the Fourier transform of a state vector with real coeffi-
cients is not necessarily a real vector. In the language of TU games, this means
that the Fourier transform of a TU game is not necessarily a TU game. Yet, the
Fourier transform is well-defined and meaningful in the wider model of decision
systems.
The Fourier transform extends naturally to interactions. Indeed, for any matrix
M ∈ Ck×k, the linear operator
C 7→ µ(C) = MC M∗ (C ∈ Ck×k)
preserves self-adjointness and thus acts as a linear operator on the Hilbert space
Hk of all (k × k) self-adjoint matrices. In particular, we have
C =
k∑
i=1
λiuiu
∗
i =⇒ µ(C) =
k∑
i=1
M(λiuiu
∗
i )M
∗ =
k∑
i=1
λi(Mui)(Mui)
∗.
Hence, ifM is unitary, we observe that the spectral decomposition of a self-adjoint
matrix C with eigenvectors ui yields a spectral decomposition of µM(C) with
eigenvectorsMui (and the same eigenvalues).
The choiceM = Ω thus yields the Fourier transform for interaction instances,
which preserves the symmetry values:
Aˆ 7→ µΩ(Aˆ) = ΩAˆΩ∗ (A ∈ Rk×k).
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3.4 Decision and quantum games
An n-person game Γ involves n players j, each of them having a set Sj of feasible
strategies relative to some systemS, which is assumed to be in an initial state α(0).
Each player j selects a strategy sj ∈ Sj and the joint selection s = (s1, . . . , sn) of
strategies then moves the system into a final state α(f). The reward of player j is
P (j)(α(f)), where P (j) is a pre-specified real-valued functional on the state space
of S.
The n-person game Γ is a decision game if it is played relative to a decision
system Dm with binary alternatives for some m > 0. By their strategic choices,
the n players influence them decision makers towards a certain decision, i.e., the
joint strategy s moves the game to a decision state
δ(f) =
∑
k∈{0,1}m
δ
(f)
k |k〉 (δ(f)k ∈ C,
∑
k∈{0,1}m
|δ(f)k |2 = 1).
In the state δ(f), the m decision makers will accept the alternative k with proba-
bility |δ(f)k |2, in which case |k〉 is considered to be the final state of the game and
player j receives a pre-specified reward p
(j)
k . Hence j’s expected payoff is
P (j)(δ(f)) =
∑
k∈{0,1}m
p
(j)
k |δ(j)k |2. (14)
Interpreting the decision states ofDm as the states of anm-dimensional quan-
tum system and regarding δ(f) as the final state of the game, we arrive at the model
of a quantum game with the payoff functionals P (j).
Remark 3.4. The payoff functionals P (j) reveal themselves as linear measure-
ments if we represent decision states not as vectors δ but as density matrices δδ∗:
P (j)(δ) =
∑
k∈{0,1}m
p
(j)
k |δk|2 = 〈P (j)|δδ∗〉,
where P (j) is now the diagonal matrix with coefficients P
(j)
kk = p
(j)
k .
In the quantum games discussed in the literature, the strategies of the individ-
ual players typically consist in the application of certain linear operations on the
states16. As an illustration, consider the generalization of the classical Prisoners’
Dilemma of Eisert et al. [3]: :
There are 2 players relative to the systemD2 = D⊗D with states given as
δ = δ00|00〉+ δ01|01〉+ δ10|10〉+ δ11|11〉 (δij ∈ C).
16see, e.g., Grabbe [8] or Guo et al. [12]
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The game is initialized by a unitary operator U and prepared into the state α(0) =
U |00〉. The players select unitary operators A and B on D, whose tensor product
A⊗B is applied to α(0). A further application of U∗ results in the final state
α(f) = U∗(A⊗B)α(0) = U∗(A⊗ B)U |00〉.
The payoff coefficients p
(j)
k , with k ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}, are the coefficients of the
payoff matrix in the classical Prisoners’ Dilemma.
Strategic choices of operators associated with the Pauli matrices π1 and π2
(Section 2.1.1), for example, would act on the states in the following way:
π1|0〉 = |0〉 and π1|1〉 = −|1〉
π2|0〉 = |1〉 and π2|1〉 = |0〉.
Eisert et al. show that the set {I, π1, π2} of admissible strategies for each player
can guarantee the existence of a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium in cases where
the classical variant does not admit such a Nash equilibrium.
Without going into further details, we mention that the Hadamard transform
H often turns out to be a powerful strategic operator in quantum games (see, e.g.,
the seminal penny flip game of Meyer [20]).
4 Markov evolutions
Interaction among agents may be time dependent. For example, opinions form
over time in mutual information exchange, and game theoretic coalitions form due
to changing economic conditions etc. Generally, we understand by an evolution
of an interaction system X = (X,A) in discrete time t a sequence ǫ = (αt)t≥0 of
states αt ∈ A.
The evolution ǫ is bounded if there is some c ∈ R such that ‖αt‖ < c holds
for all t. ǫ is mean ergodic if the averages of the state representations
α(t) =
1
t
t∑
m=1
αˆm ∈ HX
converge to a limit α(∞). We say that ǫ is a Markov evolution if there is a linear
(”evolution”) operator Φ : HX → HX such that
αˆt+1 = Φ
tαˆ0 , i.e., αˆt+1 = Φαˆt holds for all t ≥ 0.
A Markov evolution is mean ergodic if and only if it is bounded:
21
Theorem 4.1. Let φ be a linear operator on Ck. Then for any a ∈ Ck, the
following statements are equivalent:
(i) There is some c ∈ R such that ‖φta‖ ≤ c holds for all t = 0, 1.
(ii) The limit a(∞) = lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
m=1
am exists.
Proof. Theorem 2 in Faigle and Scho¨nhuth [7].

The importance of these notions lies in the fact that the mean ergodic evolu-
tions guarantee the statistical convergence of arbitrary measurements (in the sense
of Section 2.3) on the evolution. More precisely, we have
Corollary 4.1. Let φ be a linear operator on Ck. Then for any a ∈ Ck, the
following statements are equivalent:
(i) The evolution sequence (φta)t≥0 is mean ergodic.
(ii) For every linear functional f : Ck → C, the statistical averages
f
(t)
=
1
t
t∑
m=1
f(φm(a))
converge.

We illustrate this model with two well-known examples.
Markov chains. Let π ∈ Rk be a probability distribution and M ∈ Rk×k such
that every ”state” π(t) = M tπ is a probability distribution and hence satisfies
‖πt‖ ≤ k. It follows from Theorem 4.1 that (π(t))t≥0 is a mean ergodic Markov
evolution.
IfM is a probabilistic transition matrix (i.e., all columns ofM are probability
distributions), theMarkov evolution (π(t))t≥0 is a classicalMarkov chain, in which
case mean-ergodicity is well-known.
Remark 4.1. In the theory of coalition formation in cooperative game theory,
Markov chains are typically taken as underlying models for the evolutionary for-
mation process17.
17see, e.g., Faigle and Grabisch [5]
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Schro¨dinger’s wave equation. Recall that the Schro¨dinger picture of quantum
mechanics describes a state evolution of a finite-dimensional quantum system by
a time dependent function ψ with values ψ(t) ∈ Ck for some k < ∞, which is
supposed to satisfy the differential equation
∂ψ(t)
∂t
=
i
~
Hψ(t), (15)
with the matrix H being the so-called Hamiltonian of the system and ~ Planck’s
constant. AssumingH to be normal (i.e.,HH∗ = H∗H), one obtains the solution
of (15) in the form
ψ(t) = Utψ(0) (with Ut = e
−iHt/~).
Note that Ut is unitary. So ‖ψ(t)‖ = ‖ψ(0)‖ is bounded. If H moreover is
constant in time, one finds
ψ(t) = U tψ(0) with U = e−iH/~ ∈ Ck×k unitary, (16)
which exhibits the (discrete) Schro¨dinger evolution (ψ(t))t≥0 as mean-ergodic.
Remark 4.2. More generally, one sees that arbitrary unitary evolutions in Ck are
mean ergodic. This fact is well-known as von Neumann’s mean ergodic theorem.
The examples show that traditional models for the evolution of interaction
systems are quite restrictive and suggest to study evolutions in a wider context.
Remark 4.3. For a possible infinite-dimensional evolution model that includes
event observations relative to arbitrary stochastic processes as a special case, see
Faigle and Gierz [4].
Appendix: An example with two agents
Let us illustrate the main notions and results introduced in the paper. For simplic-
ity, we consider a set X two agents and interaction matrices of the form
A =
(
w1 1− w1
1− w2 w2
)
with w1, w2 ∈ [0, 1]. A is row-stochastic but not symmetric unless w1 = w2. A’s
entries are generally interpreted as interaction/activity levels, so that w1, w2 are
the activity levels of agents 1 and 2, while 1 − w1, 1 − w2 are their interaction
levels. Following Example 2.3, we understand A as an influence matrix. In this
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case, agent i would listen to the opinion of the other agent with weight 1−wi, and
to himself with weight wi.
We first apply the symmetry decomposition and find
A+ =
(
w1 1− 12W
1− 1
2
W w2
)
, A− =
(
0 −1
2
∆W
1
2
∆W 0
)
with the shorthandW = w1+w2 and∆W = w1−w2. Therefore, the self-adjoint
representation is
Aˆ =
(
w1 1− 12W − i12∆W
1− 1
2
W + i1
2
∆W w2
)
with the eigenvalues
λ =
W ±√(W − 2)2 + 2∆W 2
2
.
The corresponding eigenvectors are
u1 =
1√
8 + 2W 2 − 8W + 4∆W 2 − 2∆W√D

√
4 +W 2 − 4W +∆W 2
(1− 1
2
W + i∆W
2
)(−∆W +√D)√
1 + 1
4
W 2 −W + ∆W 2
4

u2 =
1√
8 + 2W 2 − 8W + 4∆W 2 + 2∆W√D

√
4 +W 2 − 4W +∆W 2
(1− 1
2
W + i∆W
2
)(−∆W −√D)√
1 + 1
4
W 2 −W + ∆W 2
4

One can see that calculations can become rapidly quite complex. In order to clar-
ify the results, we perform a quantum theoretically standard change of variables
and set
E0 =
W
2
∆ =
√
1
2
∆W 2 + 1 +
1
4
W 2 −W
tan θ =
2
√
1 + 1
4
W 2 −W + 1
4
∆W 2
∆W
e−iϕ =
1− 1
2
W − i1
2
∆W√
1 + 1
4
W 2 −W + 1
4
∆W 2
.
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Then the eigenvalues are
λ1 = E0 +∆, λ2 = E0 −∆,
and the unit eigenvectors take the form
u1 =
(
cos(θ/2)
eiϕ sin(θ/2)
)
, u2 =
( − sin(θ/2)
eiϕ cos(θ/2)
)
. (17)
Let us compute the evolution of the system by applying Schro¨dinger’s equa-
tion, taking the Hamiltonian to be the self-adjoint matrix Aˆ, and ψ(0) = e1 =
(1 0)T .
ψ(t) represents the state of the agents at timer t. Expressed in the (u1, u2)
basis, we find, with the (reduced) Planck constant ~ = h/2π,
ψ(t) = cos(θ/2)e−
i
~
λ1tu1 − sin(θ/2)e− i~λ2tu2
and, in the standard (e1, e2) basis, using (17):
ψ(t) = e−
i
~
E0t
(
cos(t∆/~)− i cos θ sin(t∆/~)
−ieiϕ sin(θ) sin(t∆/~)
)
.
The probability of transition from state e1 = (1 0)
T to e2 = (0 1)
T after time t is
given by
Pr = ‖〈e2|ψ(t)〉‖2 = sin2 θ sin2(t∆/~).
This probability has period π~/∆ and maximal value sin2 θ. In our case, we have
sin2 θ =
tan2 θ
tan2 θ + 1
= 1− ∆W
2
4 +W 2 − 4W + 2∆W 2 ,
which is the maximal value of the probability of transition. Its period is
π~√
1
2
∆W 2 + 1 + 1
4
W 2 −W
.
Let us consider slightly different interaction matrices A′, A′′:
A′ =
(
w1 w1 − 1
w2 − 1 w2
)
, A′′ =
(
w1 1− w1
w2 − 1 w2
)
with w1, w2 ∈ [0, 1]. In A′, the antidiagonal elements are nonpositive, which,
when A′ is interpreted as an influence matrix, corresponds to an anticonformist
attitude, since the agent has a tendency to adopt an opinion opposite to the one of
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the other agent. A′′ represents a mixed situation where agent 1 is conformist and
agent 2 is anticonformist. The corresponding self-adjoint matrices are
Â′ =
(
w1
1
2
W − 1 + i1
2
∆W
1
2
W − 1− i1
2
∆W w2
)
Â′′ =
(
w1
1
2
∆W + i(1
2
W − 1)
1
2
∆W − i(1
2
W − 1) w2
)
Observe that since in all cases the term A12 is the same, all parameters E0,∆, θ
remain the same, only ϕ changes. Consequently, the eigenvalues and probability
of transition are the same, only the evolution of ψ changes.
In the particular situation
A =
(
0 1
1 0
)
,
the agents display no activity (or no self-confidence) and interact positively (or
follow the other’s opinion fully). The eigenvalues are ±1, θ = π
2
and ∆ = 1,
yielding a maximal amplitude for probability transition and a period equal to π~.
e−iϕ = 1 holds and the evolution is
ψ(t) = cos(t/~)
(
1
0
)
− i sin(t/~)
(
0
1
)
.
Another extreme case is
A =
(
0 −1
−1 0
)
,
where the two agents have negative interaction or are pure anticonformists. The
eigenvalues are ±1, θ = π
2
and ∆ = 1, yielding a maximal amplitude for proba-
bility transition and a period equal to π~. Again e−iϕ = −1 holds with evolution
ψ(t) = cos(t/~)
(
1
0
)
+ i sin(t/~)
(
0
1
)
.
Note that in both cases, the state is oscillating with maximal amplitude, which is
well in line with the intuition that the opinion is very unstable in case every agent
just copies the activity/opinion of the other or does exactly the opposite.
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